Does Bishop Schneider peacefully adhere to Francis as pope?

(LifeSiteNews) — Following the excommunication of Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò, there has been much debate over the doctrine of “universal and peaceful acceptance/adherence,” (UPA) and how it pertains to Francis and his claim to the papacy. 

Bishop Athanasius Schneider has long voiced his opinions in favor of Francis’s legitimacy, and has recently published another article (26 November 2024) to this effect—to which this essay is a response.

Schneider’s article strongly rejects several arguments against Francis’ legitimacy, including the allegedly invalid resignation by Benedict XVI and the allegedly invalid conclave election of Francis. I have nothing to say about these arguments here.

In addition, however, he has once again proposed the UPA argument in favor of Francis’ claim: 

The spiritual good and eternal salvation of the faithful is the supreme law in the normative system of the Church. For this reason, there is the principle of supplet ecclesia (“the Church supplies”) or of sanatio in radice (“healing at the root”), that is, the Church completes what was against the human positive law, in the case of the sacraments, which demand jurisdictional faculties, e.g. confession, marriage, confirmation, the burdens of the intentions of the Masses. 

Guided by this truly pastoral principle, the instinct of the Church has also applied the principle of supplet ecclesia or sanatio in radice in cases of doubts about a renunciation or a pontifical election. Concretely, the sanatio in radice of an invalid pontifical election was expressed in the peaceful and morally universal acceptance of the new Pontiff by the episcopate and the Catholic people, and in the fact that this elected, supposedly invalid, Pontiff was named in the Canon of the Mass by practically the entire Catholic clergy. 

It is correct to say that the morally universal and peaceful adherence of the Church to a man as pope indeed serves as a sanatio of any administrative defects in an election, and shows that he is indeed the legitimate pope.^[1] 

However, in his recent essay, Schneider overlooks three key points. 

1. The Church does not universally and peacefully adhere to Francis as the pope in the relevant sense, as established beyond question in Matthew McCusker’s apparently unanswerable^[2] case
2. Bishop Athanasius Schneider does not himself peacefully adhere to Francis as pope in this relevant sense, as this essay will demonstrate 
3. Bishop Athanasius Schneider himself rejects the premises on which the UPA doctrine is based, as this essay will also demonstrate. 

In fact, as we shall see, no traditionalist or conservative can legitimately appeal to the UPA doctrine in defense of Francis’ claim to the papacy without engaging themselves in significant contradiction. 

What is ‘universal and peaceful adherence’? 

Louis Cardinal Billot expressed the UPA doctrine as follows:  

… for the Church to adhere to a false pontiff would be the same thing as if she were to adhere to a false rule of faith, since the Pope is the living rule which the Church must follow in belief and always follows in fact, as will be still more clearly apparent in what is to be said later.  

By all means God can permit that at some time or other the vacancy of the see be extended for a considerable time. He can also allow a doubt to arise about the legitimacy of one or another man elected. But He cannot permit the entire Church to receive someone as pontiff who is not a true and legitimate [pope]. 

Therefore, from the time he has been accepted and joined to the Church as the head to the body, we cannot further consider the question of a possible mistake in the election or of a [possible] deficiency of any condition whatsoever necessary for legitimacy, because the aforementioned adherence of the Church radically heals the mistake in the election and infallibly indicates the existence of all requisite conditions.^[3]

Matthew McCusker summarized the application of the UPA doctrine to Francis and his recent predecessors as follows:  

[It is argued that] ‘If a man is universally and peacefully adhered to as pope, it is established beyond doubt that such a man is pope. Francis is peacefully and universally adhered to as pope, therefore it is established beyond doubt that he is the pope.’  

The proponents of this argument would assert that Francis has been universally and peacefully adhered to as pope because all the bishops who head the local churches and exercise ordinary jurisdiction in the Church, and all the members of the College of Cardinals, would publicly state that he is the pope; and all, as far as we know, name him in the canon of the Mass.^[4] 

Some theologians describe the doctrine as referring to universal and peaceful acceptance of the man as pope. Billot uses the ideas of “acceptance” and “adherence” interchangeably in the passage above. However, there is a tendency to think that a merely verbal recognition of a man as pope is sufficient to establish the applicability of the UPA doctrine, and for modern controversialists to proceed upon that basis. 

But as McCusker also explains with reference to Cardinal Billot’s phrase “living rule of faith” there is more to the matter than that: 

To submit to a man as pope, to adhere peacefully to him as pope, is inseparable from the act of taking him to be that which he necessarily is, ‘the living rule’ of the Catholic faith.   

To refuse to accept a man as such a ‘living rule which the Church must follow in belief and always follows in faith,’ is to refuse to accept him as pope.^[5]

This is also clear in various other treatments of the doctrine, which specify that the “acceptance” constitutes more than mere sincere verbal recognition. For example, Fr. Henry I.D. Ryder (1837-1907) stated that the applicability of the UPA doctrine to a particular claimant is manifested after the claimant has commanded the faith of the Church. 

As to the third, I hold with Suarez (Disp. x. §. 5) that it is De fide (at least, after the Pope has pronounced a dogmatical definition), that he is Pope.^[6]

The Dublin Review, edited by Ryder’s theological rival William G. Ward (1812-82), expressed the same point in his explanation of the UPA doctrine, and presents this condition as an argument for its truth: 

Divine Providence he says will protect the Church against any evil results which might ensue to the Church from an unavoidable mistake of some seeming Pope for a true one. But if the false Pope proceeded to put forth doctrinal determinations quasi ex cathedra most serious evil would accrue to the Church.   

It is the explicit doctrine therefore of later theologians that so soon as a Pope recognized as such by the Universal Church has put forth any doctrinal determination he is infallibly the true Pope.   

Even F. Ryder (Letter p. 9) considers that this proposition is de fide. Whenever therefore any universally recognized Pope puts forth any doctrinal determination it is infallibly certain that he is not unbaptized, nor otherwise disqualified for the Pontificate.^[7]

By such logic, a claimant to the papacy who has not issued doctrinal definitions, or whose doctrinal definitions have not received peaceful and universal adherence, is necessarily said to be peacefully and universally accepted by the Church in the sense relevant to the question.^[8]  

When the entire Church peacefully and universally adheres to a man as the pope, his legitimacy is an example of what theologians call a dogmatic fact. 

But here, problems arise for many of those who wish to defend Francis’ claim with the UPA doctrine.  

This is not because the principles or arguments are untrue, but because they cut in more than one direction.  

What are dogmatic facts?  

The twentieth century theologian Mgr Van Noort, whose treatment is very typical and who was himself a follower of Billot, defines a dogmatic fact in standard terms: 

A dogmatic fact is a fact not contained in the sources of revelation, on the admission of which depends the knowledge or certainty of a dogma or of a revealed truth.^[9]

He also states what is the common opinion of theologians that “the Church’s infallibility extends to dogmatic facts,” and adds that it is “theologically certain.” One cannot deny a theologically certain proposition without implicitly denying the revealed truths with which it is necessarily connected. 

The examples of dogmatic facts which Van Noort gives are very standard: 

• That Vatican I was a legitimate ecumenical council 

• That the Latin Vulgate is a substantially faithful translation of the original books of the Bible 

• That Pius XII was legitimately elected pope.

Van Noort summarizes the wider issue as to why the Church’s proposition of these dogmatic facts must be infallible. He says that it is because other matters depend on the certainty of such facts: 

One can readily see that on these facts hang the questions of whether the decrees of the [First] Vatican Council are infallible, whether the Vulgate is truly Sacred Scripture, whether Pius XII is to be recognized as supreme ruler of the universal Church.^[10]

In other words, in certain cases, there are truths about which we must be certain, but about which we could not be certain if other, prior facts were uncertain: therefore, in certain cases, these prior facts must be certain. 

Another way of expressing the application is: The Church’s universal and peaceful adherence to a man as pope (or, universal use of a translation like the Vulgate, etc.) constitutes a definitive proposition/judgment of the fact that he really is so (etc.); but the Church is infallible in all such definitive propositions/judgments; therefore, the conclusions follow. 

However—prescinding for now from the question of whether Francis enjoys the peaceful and universal adherence of the Church—it is extremely incongruous for Bishop Schneider to have recourse to this argument.  

The incongruity arises from the reason why a dogmatic fact, like the legitimacy of a papal claimant with the Church’s universal and peaceful adherence, is infallibly certain. 

We can see this in the proofs given for the UPA doctrine by the theologians. These proofs refer to the nature of infallibility itself. 

The secondary object of infallibility  

The idea that we can be infallibly certain about the legitimacy of a papal claimant with the Church’s universal and peaceful adherence may seem strange to some.   

This is because many today believe that infallibility is limited to papal ex cathedra definitions and to the anathemas of councils, or those things believed “everywhere, by everyone, and at all times,” or revealed before the death of St John. 

However, it is theologically certain that the Church’s infallibility extends to those “other truths which are required necessarily in order to guard the whole deposit of revelation.”^[11]

These “other truths” are referred to as the secondary object of infallibility. As suggested above, Van Noort defines such truths as being so “closely connected with the revealed deposit that revelation itself would be imperiled unless an absolutely certain decision could be made about them.”^[12]  

He explains further that this is because the Church herself requires infallibility in such areas in order to be the safe guide of the Christian religion: 

The charism of infallibility was bestowed upon the Church so that the latter could piously safeguard and confidently explain the deposit of Christian revelation, and thus could be in all ages the teacher of Christian truth and of the Christian way of life. 

But if the Church is to fulfill this purpose, it must be infallible in its judgment of doctrines and facts which, even though not revealed, are so intimately connected with revelation that any error or doubt about them would constitute a peril to the faith.  

Furthermore, the Church must be infallible not only when it issues a formal decree, but also when it performs some action which, for all practical purposes, is the equivalent of a doctrinal definition.^[13]

Van Noort explains that the secondary object is distinguished from the primary object, which includes “only the truths contained in the actual deposit of revelation.”^[14] He states that the “allied matters” which “contribute to its safeguarding and security, come within the purview of infallibility not by their very nature, but rather by reason of the revealed truth to which they are annexed.”^[15]

What is important here is, as implied by Billot and expressed by Ryder and Ward above, that if the Church were not infallible in matters pertaining to the secondary object of infallibility (including the legitimacy of a particular Roman Pontiff under certain circumstances) then the faithful could not rely on her regarding truths “required necessarily” to guard the Faith. No Catholic can admit such a possibility for the Church. 

When he reaches his defense of the UPA doctrine in particular, Van Noort again refers back to these more general points: 

Proof 1: From the purpose of infallibility. The Church is infallible in those related matters in which an error would constitute a danger to the faith. But dogmatic facts are matters of this kind.  

The reason should be obvious from the examples alleged above. What good would it do to proclaim in theory the infallible authority of ecumenical councils if one could licitly doubt the legitimacy of a specific council?  

What good would it do to acknowledge the inspiration of the Sacred Books in their original forms—forms long ago extinct—if one could not definitively establish the substantial fidelity of copies of the original, and of the translations which the Church has to use?  

Could Christians be effectively protected against errors in their faith if the Church could not warn them against poisonous fare, such as are books which contain heresy or errors in religious matters?^[16]

Are we to conclude from all this that Francis must infallibly be the pope, because otherwise there would be “a danger to the faith” for Christians?  

Again leaving aside the fact that Francis does not enjoy the peaceful and universal adherence of the Church, such a conclusion seems nonsensical. The most common complaint of traditionalists and conservatives is that Francis himself is a danger to the faith. Bishop Schneider himself stated: 

The way to react to the confusing behavior of Pope Francis is to admonish him publicly regarding his errors. That said, one must do this with all due respect. Then one must make a profession of faith by specifying those truths which Pope Francis has contradicted or undermined by his ambiguities. Then one must do acts of reparation. One must also ask God for the grace of Pope Francis’ conversion and for the Divine intervention to resolve this unprecedented crisis. Nevertheless, Pope Francis is certainly the valid Pope.   

But one cannot say “Francis must be the pope, because him not being the pope would constitute a danger to the faith,” if one is simultaneously arguing that there is already a danger to the faith in Francis himself, and this despite him being pope.  

Now, the theologians who address this topic typically treat the same four to six “allied matters” under the heading of the secondary object—including also:  

• Theological conclusions 

• The approval of religious orders 

• The canonization of saints 

• Universal disciplinary laws.  

In fact, it seems more conducive to clarity to treat the latter three as examples of dogmatic facts, as compellingly argued by Fr Francisco Marín-Sola—not least because “the force of logic has led [theologians] to apply to the canonization of the saints a solution identical or similar to the one given by them to the problem of dogmatic facts.”^[17]

But regardless of terminology, we have arrived at a clear view of the incongruity of Bishop Schneider’s recourse to UPA argument.   

The same theologians and arguments which establish the UPA doctrine also conclude, based on precisely the same reasons, that these “allied matters” also fall under the secondary object of infallibility. 

And yet while Bishop Schneider insists that Catholics must assent to his private interpretation and application of the UPA doctrine to Francis, he himself publicly doubts, denies or redefines several of these other “allied matters.” 

The canonization of Saints 

Canonizations can be defined as follows: 

Canonization (formal) is the final and definitive decree by which the sovereign pontiff declares that someone has been admitted to heaven and is to be venerated by everyone, at least in the sense that all the faithful are held to consider the person a saint worthy of public veneration. 

It differs from beatification, which is a provisional rather than a definitive decree, by which veneration is only permitted, or at least is not universally prescribed.^[18]

Many have raised concerns about some of Francis’ canonizations.  

Some have tried to justify their doubts on the basis that certain candidates were “invalid matter” for canonization, or that canonizations themselves now are:  

• Now based on political motives 

• Now based on a less rigorous process 

• Now based on a new concept of sainthood 

• Now no longer backed by the infallible authority of the pope, but by some other collegial authority 

• Not a teaching act, and therefore not subject to the assistance of the charism of infallibility. 

Others have tried to minimize the problem by suggesting that canonization means that the person canonized is in heaven, and nothing more. 

While Bishop Schneider himself does not seem to doubt or deny any particular canonization from Francis, he does provides a unique (and erroneously reductive) re-definition of the canonization of saints, in his recent catechism book Credo: 

Acts of canonization guarantee that devotion to a saint is not contrary to the Faith and can be for the spiritual good of the believer.^[19]

He states, like many critics of the new canonizations, that the issue “has not been settled conclusively,” and that some “serious theologians have strong reasons” for holding that canonizations are fallible.^[20] He also claims that “the Church has not infallibly proclaimed or formally taught that canonizations of saints are infallible acts.”^[21]  

But this appears to be false, or at least very misleading. First, Schneider himself notes that a “widespread theological opinion is that canonizations are infallible.”^[22] Van Noort—as one proponent of this “widespread opinion”—explains in terms which are substantially the same as his arguments for the infallibility of dogmatic facts: 

Proof 2: From the purpose of infallibility. The Church is infallible so that it may be a trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion and of the Christian way of life. But it would not be such if it could err in the canonization of saints. 

Would not religion be sullied if a person in hell were, by a definitive decree, offered to everyone as an object of religious veneration? Would not the moral law be at least weakened to some extent, if a protege of the devil could be irrevocably set up as a model of virtue for all to imitate and for all to invoke?^[23]  

Further, it is axiomatic in the discussion of the secondary object of infallibility that the Church’s infallibility extends as far as she claims it to extend, and that she cannot be mistaken in this matter.^[24]  

It is clear that several popes have claimed infallibility for their acts of canonization, and with no indication that this claim was limited to this or that particular canonization.^[25] Therefore, it seems that the Church really is infallible in such acts, notwithstanding any delay in theologians taking cognizance of this reality.^[26]  

Further, the reasons for thinking that the Church is infallible in her judgment of dogmatic facts (including the UPA doctrine) apply with at least equal force to canonizations—if not more, due to the overlooked magisterial argument. But if we feel free to accept the doubt that Schneider tries to cast over the infallibility of canonizations, it is difficult to see why we should still feel obliged to accept the UPA doctrine—which, even though certain, stands on less secure magisterial ground than the infallibility of canonizations.  

But in fact, aside from any explicit teaching on the matter, the Church makes clear by her actions, and other implicit and tacit teaching acts, that canonizations, the proposition of dogmatic facts and the legitimacy of a man to whom the Church universally and peacefully adheres as pope are all infallible, and for the same reasons, which stand or fall together. 

For these reasons, it is highly incongruous for Bishop Schneider, who casts doubt on the infallibility of canonizations in general, to have recourse to the UPA doctrine in defence of Francis. 

Even if Francis is the true pope, or enjoys the universal and peaceful adherence of the Church, Schneider’s treatment of canonizations denies the grounds for making such an argument in advance.  

Universal disciplinary laws 

Another matter, in which the same theological authorities propose with the same arguments and for the same reasons, is the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws.  

What is meant by “infallibility” in this context? Van Noort explains: 

Assertion 3: The Church’s infallibility extends to the general discipline of the Church. This proposition is theologically certain. 

By the term “general discipline of the Church” are meant those ecclesiastical laws passed for the universal Church for the direction of Christian worship and Christian living.

Note the italicized words: ecclesiastical laws, passed for the universal Church.

The imposing of commands belongs not directly to the teaching office but to the ruling office; disciplinary laws are only indirectly an object of infallibility, i.e., only by reason of the doctrinal decision implicit in them. When the Church’s rulers sanction a law, they implicitly make a twofold judgment:

1. ‘This law squares with the Church’s doctrine of faith and morals’; that is, it imposes nothing that is at odds with sound belief and good morals. This amounts to a doctrinal decree.

2. ‘This law, considering all the circumstances, is most opportune.’ This is a decree of practical judgment.^[27]

For these reasons, we could understand “the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws” has the infallible goodness or morality of such laws; and this is indeed how some theologians explain this matter.  

As with the canonization of saints, the arguments in favour of disciplinary infallibility are precisely the same as those around dogmatic facts and in favour of the UPA doctrine. Consider Van Noort’s explanation: 

Proof: 1. From the purpose of infallibility. The Church was endowed with infallibility that it might safeguard the whole of Christ’s doctrine and be for all men a trustworthy teacher of the Christian way of life. 

But if the Church could make a mistake in the manner alleged when it legislated for the general discipline, it would no longer be either a loyal guardian of revealed doctrine or a trustworthy teacher of the Christian way of life. It would not be a guardian of revealed doctrine, for the imposition of a vicious law would be, for all practical purposes, tantamount to an erroneous definition of doctrine; everyone would naturally conclude that what the Church had commanded squared with sound doctrine. It would not be a teacher of the Christian way of life, for by its laws it would induce corruption into the practice of religious life. 

2. From the official statement of the Church, which [in Pius VI’s Auctorem fidei] stigmatized as ‘at least erroneous’ the hypothesis ‘that the Church could establish discipline which would be dangerous, harmful, and conducive to superstition and materialism.’^[28]

Van Noort gives the liturgy as a special example of what he has in mind as an infallible discipline: 

The well-known axiom. Lex orandi est lex credendi (The law of prayer is the law of belief), is a special application of the doctrine of the Church’s infallibility in disciplinary matters. 

This axiom says in effect that formulae of prayer approved for public use in the universal Church cannot contain errors against faith or morals.^[29] 

Van Noort is very far from being alone here. Cardinal Billot teaches the same doctrine as Van Noort, stating that the Church “can never institute a discipline which would be in any way opposed to the rule of faith or to evangelical holiness.”^[30] Sixto Cartechini writes:  

[A]lthough it is not repugnant that sometimes the Church, in things of little importance, tolerates in ancient prayers some expressions which are not entirely exact, she cannot, however, permit that forms of expression be used in the liturgy, in her name, which are contrary to her beliefs and convictions.^[31] 

Many other authorities could be cited, but they are all simply explaining texts such as this: 

Council of Trent: ‘Can. 7. If anyone says that the ceremonies, vestments, and outward signs, which the Catholic Church uses in the celebration of Masses, are incentives to impiety rather than the services of piety: let him be anathema.'^[32]  

These authorities typically also point to the definitive teaching of Pius VI in Auctorem fidei, Gregory XVI in Quo graviora and Leo XIII in Testem benevolentiae. To these, we could also add Pius XII’s comments in Mystici Corporis:  

Certainly the loving Mother is spotless in the Sacraments by which she gives birth to and nourishes her children; in the faith which she has always preserved inviolate; in her sacred laws imposed on all […]^[33]

Gregory XVI taught that it is impossible for the Church to “ordain, grant, or permit what would turn to the detriment of the soul’s salvation, to the contempt and harm of a sacrament instituted by Christ.”^[34] 

Because of this, it could be argued that the infallibility of such laws is even more certain than that of the UPA doctrine: while both rest on precisely the same intrinsic premises, the former also enjoys the additional extrinsic authority of having been taught by the magisterium on multiple occasions. 

However, in spite of this, Bishop Schneider explicitly denies the infallibility of such laws in general, and even claims that various universal laws are “at odds with sound belief and good morals.”^[35]  

For example: in the work already mentioned, Bishop Schneider implies^[36] that “universal ecclesiastical laws” in general can be:  

• “Manifestly harmful” 

• “Undermin[ing] or evidently harm[ing] the clarity of integrity” of the faith, morals or liturgy.^[37]

Schneider also condemns several provisions of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, which he nonetheless calls “a main compendium” of “universal ecclesiastical law” elsewhere.^[38]  

Specifically, he condemns the permission granted to Catholic ministers to administer penance, holy communion and extreme unction to certain groups of those outside the Catholic Church.^[39] 

On the more general level, Schneider denies what is taught by the magisterium and the theologians mentioned, stating that the “disciplinary norms” of an ecumenical council are “beyond the scope of infallibility,” and that “the disciplinary acts of the hierarchy are not infallible.”^[40] 

This denial is based on an equivocation, namely that universal disciplinary laws are “subject to possible future revision.”^[41] 

But as we have already seen, this is to misunderstand what is meant by “infallibility” in this context. Van Noort explains the infallibility of universal disciplines does not mean that such disciplines are irreformable (they are indeed reformable, as he says), nor even that they are necessarily always opportune or prudent.^[42] 

However, as we shall see, Bishop Schneider and others go far beyond suggesting that some apparently universal disciplinary laws are “imprudent” or “inopportune in the circumstances.” 

Bishop Schneider’s criticism of the post-conciliar liturgy  

Returning to Credo, Schneider offers the following criticisms of the Novus Ordo liturgy: 

• It contains “doctrinally ambiguous prayers” 

• Its prayers “emphasize the aspect of a meal while seriously obscuring the propitiatory nature of the sacrifice” and thus “are very close to a Protestant understanding.”^[43]

Further, in light of Schneider’s references to meals, ambiguity and Protestant worship above, his discussion of superstition and liturgical innovation elsewhere in Credo appears to constitute further condemnation of the Novus Ordo liturgy: 

372. What kinds of superstition involve undue worship of the true God? False worship, which contains something contrary to natural truth or divine revelation, as when false revelations are maintained; impious worship, as when a man-centered worship is established in violation of the Church’s constant liturgical tradition.

375. Why do man-centered forms of worship violate the Church’s constant liturgical tradition? Because only ‘the received and approved rites of the Church’ offer to God the worship that He has prescribed, and only her constant liturgical custom best safeguards the truly God-centered form of worship

376. What is the most common form of man-centered worship today? Drastic liturgical innovations and abuses, by which one introduces into the worship of the Church something contrary to her traditional doctrine or custom, e.g., a Protestant and banquet-style celebration of the Mass as in a closed circle, dances, show performances, tokens of secular organizations or pagan religions, etc.

377. Why are such innovations reprehensible within Catholic worship? Even if they contain no objective falsehood, such innovations undermine the constant Tradition of the Church, and violate the sacred rites themselves: ‘He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it.’”^[44]

However, Schneider characterizes such issues as rendering a liturgical form merely “deficient,” and attempts to justify his claims by comparing them to the short-lived sixteenth century breviary reform of Cardinal Quignonez, which he presents as an explanatory precedent.^[45]  

But this is a very equivocal precedent indeed. Schneider’s criticisms of the Novus Ordo are completely different in kind to those which Quignonez’s breviary received.^[46] 

In any case, we can prescind from the validity of his critiques of the Novus Ordo liturgy, because the point at hand is the same as that with canonizations. It is this:  

• By stating that the universal disciplines of the Church can be dangerous and harmful and criticising particular examples of universal laws, Schneider is implicitly denying that the Church is, as Van Noort said, a “trustworthy teacher of the Christian religion and of the Christian way of life.”  

• This in turn denies the grounds for the secondary object of infallibility as a whole, and the UPA doctrine in particular.  

Such a claim necessarily entails surrendering the right to insist that others accept one’s interpretation of the UPA doctrine and its application to Francis. 

Schneider and Francis’ own universal disciplines  

So far, we have considered Bishop Schneider’s rejection of the infallibility of universal disciplinary laws in general, as well as particular examples such as the Novus Ordo liturgy and the 1983 Code of Canon Law. 

Schneider has also publicly criticised Francis’ Traditionis Custodes, stating these restrictions go beyond Francis’ authority, and constituted an “abusive prohibition.”^[47]  

This goes beyond questioning the prudence or timeliness of his restrictions.  

Aside from liturgical matters, other directives which would appear to be universal disciplinary laws have found themselves subject to Schneider’s criticism, on the similar grounds of their being dangerous, evil or non-Catholic.   

Schneider’s criticism of Francis’ Amoris Laetitia 

Amoris Laetitia has the appearance of a universal discipline, in that its “official interpretation” arguably presumes to establish a discipline for the universal Church, and used the Acta Apostolica Sedis to do so. 

Schneider referred to this as an example of “doctrinally erroneous and morally problematic sacramental practices.”^[48]  

Schneider’s criticism of Francis’ Fiducia Supplicans, 2024  

Although Francis seems to have only approved Fiducia Supplicans in a general way,49 he has nonetheless continued to support its provisions by his silence, in the face of great complaint and scandal.   

Francis’ silence in the face of this represents an increase in such support. 

Fiducia Supplicans, along with certain other documents of the DDF, seems as if it should be considered as a universal disciplinary law, in that it purports to establish lines of conduct for the universal Church.^[49]

And yet Schneider, along with Archbishop Tomash Peta, criticised Fiducia Supplicans as follows in their shared statement: 

The fact that the document does not give permission for the ‘marriage’ of same-sex couples should not blind pastors and faithful to the great deception and the evil that resides in the very permission to bless couples in irregular situations and same-sex couples.  

Such a blessing directly and seriously contradicts Divine Revelation and the uninterrupted, bimillennial doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church. To bless couples in an irregular situation and same-sex couples is a serious abuse of the most Holy Name of God, since this name is invoked upon an objectively sinful union of adultery or of homosexual activity.  

Therefore, none, not even the most beautiful, of the statements contained in this Declaration of the Holy See, can minimize the far-reaching and destructive consequences resulting from this effort to legitimize such blessings. With such blessings, the Catholic Church becomes, if not in theory, then in practice, a propagandist of the globalist and ungodly ‘gender ideology.'^[50] 

Schneider’s criticism of Francis’ Spiritus Domini, 2021 

Some might also include the admission of women to the “instituted ministries” (quasi-minor orders) of Lector and Acolyte in the motu proprio Spiritus Domini (2021) which modified the 1983 Code of Canon Law.  

And yet Schneider has also condemned this as “a grave and manifest rupture with the uninterrupted liturgical tradition of the Eastern and Western Church,” and that “[a] further logical consequence would be the proposal to ask for the sacramental diaconate for women.”^[51]  

Schneider stated that in the future, Rome “must undoubtedly rectify this unprecedented break with the universal practice of the Church.”^[52]  

In short, Schneider openly criticizes, condemns and rejects disciplines which he believes (based on Francis’ alleged legitimacy) to be universal laws. This constitutes another denial of a key premise of the UPA doctrine.   

Conclusion 

While arguing forcefully for his private interpretation and application of the UPA doctrine to Francis, and accusing those who disagree of approaching schism,^[53]Schneider simultaneously denies the infallibility of other dogmatic facts (in Marín-Sola’s terminology) such as canonizations and universal laws; as well as condemning particular examples of what he holds to be as universal disciplines. 

In other words, Bishop Schneider (a) does not himself adhere peacefully to Francis as the pope in the relevant sense (notwithstanding his sincere verbal profession to the contrary); and also (b) rejects the very grounds on which the UPA argument is based.

Put plainly, Schneider is thus a counter-example to his own argument, the premises of which he denies. For these reasons, his UPA argument for the legitimacy of Francis’ alleged papacy nullifies itself.

Further, Schneider argues that the visibility of the Church depends on Francis being pope, while advancing criticisms which themselves entail the denial of the formal visibility of the Church.^[54] The visibility which Schneider defends is thus a purely naturalistic one, not one of traditional doctrine and theology.  

Schneider also suggests that if Francis is not the pope, then the gates of hell will have prevailed over the Church. But traditional teaching and theology hold that the Church’s indefectibility precludes the the pope committing such acts as those which Schneider criticizes. 

As such, he must either (a) give up his use of the UPA defense for Francis, or (b) give up his critiques of the post-conciliar canonizations, liturgy and laws. They cannot be held simultaneously.

But he cannot give up the latter, because these critiques are true and certain.

Therefore he must give up the former.  

The solution to the problems presented  

I would like to conclude by affirming: 

• That a papal claimant to whom the Church peacefully and universally adheres is indeed the pope 

• That his legitimacy is indeed a dogmatic fact, and infallible for all the reasons discussed by Van Noort 

• That canonizations and universal disciplinary laws are also infallible, for the same reasons discussed. 

However, there are only two ways that one can accept all this. 

The first way is to claim (most improbably) that Francis does indeed enjoy the peaceful and universal adherence of the Church as pope; that there are no problems with the new canonizations, which are indeed infallible; and that the disciplines critiqued are in fact all good, and in keeping with the Catholic faith. 

This is the way of denial: of denying the facts, of denying what is before our “lying eyes,” and of denying the known truth. 

The second way is accepting all these propositions of traditional theology; to admit that Schneider’s criticisms are largely true; but also to admit the truth—that Francis does not enjoy universal and peaceful adherence as the pope.

This does not mean that he is not the pope, as a true pope may lack the universal and peaceful adherence of the Church. But it does mean that Schneider cannot mount this argument in Francis’ defense.

While it may appear, on a superficial level, that Francis is accepted as pope, we need to recognise that appearances can be deceiving. We need to understand what “universal and peaceful adherence” really means (and what it does not mean), and to have our certainties in order. We need to remember that we can be more certain of the faith and of the Church than of the identity of an individual claimant to the papacy—especially under circumstances like our own.  

But once someone rejects the infallibility of one heading of the secondary object of infallibility, he may as well reject them all; he is implicitly rejecting the arguments upon which all the others are built.  

It makes no sense for him to insist that the UPA doctrine proves Francis legitimate, because otherwise the Church would have fallen into danger, or into errors against the faith, or even have defected.

He has already explicitly admitted that the Church has fallen into danger and errors against the faith—through what he says are: 

• Harmful, “man-centered” and non-Catholic liturgy  

• Evil and doctrinally erroneous disciplinary laws.

In short, by insisting that Francis is a true pope, Bishop Schneider is already implicitly saying that the Church has defected.  

By contrast, denying or doubting that Francis could be a true pope is the central way by which we can have the joy of understanding how Christ’s promises to his one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church—the Roman Catholic Church—continue to be fulfilled in our era.